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Abstract
This paper empirically studies the dynamic relationship between
monetary and ﬁscal policies by analyzing the comovements between
the Fed funds rate and the primary deﬁcit/output ratio. Simple
economic thinking establishes that a negative correlation between Fed
rate and deﬁcit arises whenever the two policy authorities share a
common stabilization objective. However, when budget balancing
concerns lead to a drastic deﬁcit reduction the Fed may reduce the
Fed rate in order to smooth the impact of ﬁscal policy, which results
in a positive correlation between these two policy instruments. The
empirical results show (i) a signiﬁcant negative comovement between
Fed rate and deﬁcit and (ii) that deﬁcit and output gap Granger-cause
the Fed funds rate during the post-Volcker era, but the opposite is not
true.
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11I N T R O D U C T I O N
Some economists may have the perception that the Federal Reserve tends
to counteract aggregate demand variations caused by deﬁcit changes (see,
for instance, DeLong, 2003 p.384) asaw a yo fs m o o t h i n gt h ei m p a c to f
ﬁscal policy. For instance, President Reagan’s tax cut was followed by a
restrictive monetary policy. In this scenario, one would expect a positive
correlation between the Fed funds rate (the monetary policy instrument) and
the primary deﬁcit-output ratio (the ﬁscal instrument). However, it is not
hard to imagine other scenarios where the two economic policy authorities
share a common stabilization objective and thus the Fed rate and the primary
deﬁcit show a negative correlation. This would be the case in a recession
(expansion) where the monetary authority may coordinate with the ﬁscal
authority for a fall (rise) of the Fed rate with an increase (decrease) of
the primary deﬁcit-output ratio (which we will refer to hereafter as “the
deﬁcit”). A similar argument can be established when the two authorities
ﬁght inﬂationary pressures together.
At the heart of the dynamic relationship between the two policy
instruments are the causes leading to the shifts in both monetary and ﬁscal
policies during the post-war period in the U.S. Many macroeconomists believe
that U.S. monetary policy changed to a strong anti-inﬂationary regime when
Paul Volcker became Fed chairman in late 1979.1 Similarly, as documented
by Davig, Leeper and Chung (2004), ﬁscal policy has exhibited pendulum
swings where periods characterized by tight ﬁscal policy aiming at budget
balancing (i.e. a “passive” ﬁscal policy) are followed by periods characterized
by a countercyclical ﬁscal policy (i.e. an “active” stabilizing ﬁscal policy).2
This paper empirically investigates the dynamic relationship between
Fed rate and deﬁcit. This analysis will shed light on three related sets of
questions: (i) Is there a signiﬁcant comovement between Fed rate and deﬁcit?
1Some economists believe that the switch in monetary policy went from a passive to an
active monetary regime, using Leeper’s (1991) taxonomy. Sargent (1999) and Cogley and
Sargent (2005) share this view. Alternatively, Sims and Zha (2004) argue that the regime
changes in the systematic component of the monetary policy reaction function have been
rather modest compared to the large changes in the non-systematic component.
2Strictly speaking, we do not use the terms “active” and “passive” policy as deﬁned
by Leeper (1991). According to Leeper’s taxonomy, an economic policy authority is
passive when its policies are determined by the intertemporal budget constraint. But
this policy stand does not preclude that the policy authority might follow an “active”
countercyclical policy in the short-run even though its policy is determined by a “passive”
budget balancing objective in the long-run. From now on, the term “active” policy stands
for countercyclical policy whereas the term “passive” policy stands for a policy aimed at
budget balancing.
2Do monetary and ﬁscal instruments move together in pursuit of a common
stabilization objective? (ii) Is the comovement between monetary and ﬁscal
instruments stable over time? Does a “passive” ﬁscal policy last for long?
(iii) Is there evidence of a causal relationship between Fed rate and deﬁcit?
Is the deﬁcit Granger-causing the Fed rate? We believe that the answers to
these questions are important because they can help to evaluate and design
dynamic macroeconomic models for analyzing issues of monetary and ﬁscal
policy coordination.
Some examples of recent literature concerned with related issues on
coordination and switching of ﬁscal and monetary policies follow. Using
a theoretical approach, Davig, Leeper and Chung (2004) study how the
presence of switching-regimes in ﬁscal and monetary policies changes the
eﬀects of economic policy. At the empirical level, by using an augmented VAR
speciﬁcation, Favero and Monacelli (2003) show evidence of monetary and
ﬁscal policy regime shifts in the U.S. and of how the analysis of a monetary-
ﬁscal policy mix helps to explain U.S. inﬂation dynamics.
This paper follows three empirical approaches. First, we compute rolling
measures of the unconditional correlation coeﬃcient between Fed rate and
deﬁcit for three diﬀerent amplitudes (ﬁve, ten and twenty year windows).
Roughly speaking, as the window becomes wider (narrower) the rolling
measure of the unconditional correlation coeﬃcient gives more weight to
the low (high) frequency components of the time series. The analysis of
rolling correlation dynamics is a useful preliminary approach for studying
the changing comovement between Fed funds rate and deﬁcit. However, the
Fed rate and deﬁcit may be aﬀected by other variables characterizing the
state of the economy, such as inﬂation and the level of economic activity. For
this reason, the two approaches below consider VAR processes that include
the output gap and inﬂation in addition to the Fed rate and deﬁcit.
Second, we use Den Haan’s (2000) method to analyze the comovements
between Fed rate and deﬁcit. Den Haan proposes using the correlations of
VAR forecast errors at diﬀerent horizons. In this way one can take into
account a full set of statistics characterizing comovement dynamics in an
eﬃcient manner. In particular, in order to analyze the comovement between
Fed rate and deﬁc i tw ee s t i m a t eaf o u r - v a r i a b l eVAR that includes four-
quarter average inﬂation and output gap in addition to these variables.
The two approaches outlined above are useful for uncovering the dynamic
correlation between ﬁscal and monetary policy instruments, but they can
neither provide information on causality nor detect the presence of switching
regimes. For this reason, we also study the dynamic relationship between Fed
rate and deﬁcit by estimating a two-state four-variable Markov switching
VAR (MSVAR) model à la Hamilton. For the sake of simplicity, it is
3considered that the same two-state Markov switching process characterizes
both the systematic part and the variance-covariance of the disturbances
of the MSVAR. Following Pelletier (2006), we can further estimate in a
quite straightforward manner the regime-switching dynamic correlations of
the alternative variables of the model. This approach allows us to estimate
the dates of regime switching without imposing them as occurs in the ﬁrst
two approaches considered.
[Insert FIGURE 1]
This paper uses U.S. quarterly data running from 1961:2 to 2003:4.3
Figure 1 shows plots of the four time series studied. The empirical results
from the ﬁrst two approaches show a negative relationship between the Fed
rate and the deﬁcit for most periods. Particularly remarkable is the ﬁnding
of a signiﬁcant comovement between the Fed rate and the deﬁcit using Den
Haan’s method during the post-war period in the U.S., a period characterized
by several shifts in monetary and ﬁscal policies. Negative comovement shows
up during the 60’s, 70’s and early 80’s, characterized by outstanding shocks
and economic ﬂuctuations, as well as during the late 80’s and the 90’s, which
are characterized by stability and economic growth. Therefore, the ﬁnding
of a negative comovement between Fed rate and deﬁcit at several forecast
horizons can be considered as a robust stylized fact that can be used to
evaluate the performance of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
that aim to study monetary and ﬁscal coordination issues.
A negative comovement between Fed rate and deﬁcit further suggests
that monetary and ﬁscal policies work together in pursuit of a common
stabilization objective. In other words, the eﬀects of an “active” stabilizing
ﬁscal policy seem to dominate the eﬀects of a “passive” ﬁscal policy concerned
with budget balancing over the post-war period.
The empirical results from the third approach provide additional support
for the results found with the other two approaches. First, the post-
Volcker period is characterized by a stable regime (say, state 1) featuring
3The Fed funds rate is taken from FRED (http://research/stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
Output gap is calculated as the natural log of the ratio between real gross domestic product
(GDPC96, seasonally adjusted) provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis and real potential gross domestic product (GDPPOT) provided by the
U.S. Congress: Congressional Budget Oﬃce. Four-quarter average inﬂation is computed
from the gross domestic product implicit price deﬂator (GDPDEF) provided by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Finally, the primary deﬁcit-
output ratio (seasonally adjusted) is taken from OECD statistics.
4as i g n i ﬁcant negative correlation between Fed rate and deﬁcit. Moreover,
each variable exhibits a high degree of persistence and the eﬀects of other
variables are rather small under this regime. Second, the pre-Volcker period
is characterized by frequent switches between the two states considered and
the economy at the time of the two oil crises is in state 2, characterized by a
positive but nonsigniﬁcant correlation between Fed rate and deﬁcit. Finally,
the empirical results suggest that output gap and deﬁcit Granger-cause the
Fed rate from 1984 to the end of the sample (that is, the post-Volcker era),4
but the opposite is not true.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the rolling
correlation dynamics. Section 3 implements Den Haan’s method to analyze
the comovements between Fed rate and deﬁcit. Section 4 introduces and
estimates the two-state four-variable MSVAR model considered, which allows
us to compute regime-switching dynamic correlations. Section 5 concludes.
2 DYNAMIC CORRELATIONS
In this section we compute the rolling unconditional correlation coeﬃcient
between pairs of variables for three window sizes: ﬁve years (twenty
observations), ten years (forty observations) and twenty years (eighty
observations). In addition to studying the dynamic correlation between Fed
rate and deﬁcit, we also analyze on the one hand the dynamic correlation
between the Fed rate and a structural measure of deﬁcit from which an
automatic stabilizing component of the deﬁcit has already been removed.
More precisely, this structural measure is deﬁned as the residual obtained
from the least-squares projection of the primary deﬁcit-output ratio on the
output gap. By analyzing this alternative measure of ﬁscal policy we can
further establish whether the discretionary component of ﬁscal policy is
c o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h eF e dr a t e .
Figures 2-4 show the dynamic correlations between two pairs of variables
using window sizes of ﬁve, ten and twenty years, respectively. The correlation
coeﬃcient between Fed rate and deﬁcit changes substantially in the short-
run (5-year window) and in the medium-run (10-year window). As expected,
it changes more smoothly in the long-run (20-year window). Interestingly,
the results for structural deﬁcits and observed deﬁcits are more similar
4We denote this period as the post-Volcker era because one can feel conﬁdent that the
eﬀects of Fed Chairman Volcker’s monetary experiment on the Fed funds rate had vanished
by 1984.
5when a large window is considered. The rationale is that in the long-
run analysis (that is, the 20-year window) the cyclical component of the
deﬁcit vanishes because GDP converges to potential GDP.5 We also observe
a negative correlation between Fed rate and deﬁcit for most periods and a
stronger negative correlation is found when the discretional measure of deﬁcit
is considered. These results thus show preliminary evidence that monetary
and ﬁscal policies work together by sharing common stabilization objectives.
However, the correlation coeﬃcient is close to zero, especially for the observed
measure of deﬁcit, when analyzing long-run dynamics (that is, the 20-year
window) during the post-Volcker era (after 1984). This latter result can
be explained by the priority shift in ﬁscal policy toward long-run budget
balancing as from the mid-eighties as documented by Davig, Leeper and
Chung (2004).
The simple rolling correlation dynamics computed in this section provide
i n f o r m a t i o no nt h ec h a n g i n gc o m o v e m e n tb e t w e e nF e df u n d sr a t ea n dd e ﬁcit.
Are these comovement results robust to alternative speciﬁcations? In
particular, the Fed rate and deﬁcit may be aﬀected by other variables, such
as the state of the economy. The cyclical state of the economy is typically
characterized by inﬂation and a measure of the level of economic activity
such as the output gap. For this reason, the two approaches followed below
consider VAR processes that include output gap and inﬂa t i o ni na d d i t i o nt o




3 THE COMOVEMENT BETWEEN FED
RATE AND DEFICIT
This section analyzes the comovement between Fed rate and deﬁcit using the
method suggested by Den Haan (2000).6 This method calculates forecast
errors at diﬀerent horizons from an estimated VAR that includes at least
5I thank a referee for suggesting this intuition.
6Appendix 1 provides a brief description of Den Haan’s method for readers unfamilar
with this way of analyzing comovements.
6the pair of variables whose comovement we are interested in studying. As
mentioned above, we include four variables in the VAR:t h eF e dr a t e ,
inﬂation, output gap and deﬁcit. The Akaike information criterion (AIC)
is used to determine the number of lags. The number of lags chosen is six.
We do not consider any measure of structural deﬁcit in the remaining
sections of the paper for two reasons. First, the comovement analysis carried
out in this section and the dynamic correlation analysis performed in the
next section are based on the non-systematic component of the VAR (i.e.
the forecast errors) and thus the deﬁcit forecast error will be free from any
systematic component of the deﬁcit, and in particular from any automatic
stabilizing component. Second, using structural deﬁcit data generated from
least-squares regression may result in the well-known generated regressor
problem (Pagan, 1984).
Following Den Haan (2000), we estimate the correlation coeﬃcients of
VAR forecast errors by calculating the forecast errors for each horizon
considered (from one quarter to 28 quarters) as the diﬀerence between
the realizations and the corresponding forecasts and then calculating the
correlations of these forecast errors for each horizon.7 Since the estimated
correlation coeﬃcients are subject to sampling variation, conﬁdence bands
are constructed using bootstrap methods. More speciﬁcally, the estimated
VAR and its bootstrapped errors are used to generate 2500 simulated data
sets. Then, for each simulated data set the correlation coeﬃcients at diﬀerent
horizons are estimated and standard conﬁdence bands are calculated.8
[Insert FIGURE 5]
Figure 5 shows the estimated correlation coeﬃcients between the forecast
errors of the Fed rate and deﬁcit (solid line) and the 10% − 90% (dots
and dashes) and 5% − 95% conﬁdence bands (dashed lines) constructed
u s i n gb o o t s t r a pm e t h o d s .F i g u r e5s h o w sas i g n i ﬁcant negative comovement
between Fed rate and deﬁcit at short-term forecast horizons up to four years
(16 quarters) at standard signiﬁcance levels.
7Den Haan and Sumner (2004) suggest an alternative method of estimating the
correlation coeﬃcients, which uses the covariance obtained from the VAR coeﬃcients and
the variance-covariance matrix of the white noise VAR disturbance process. They argue
that using this method leads to eﬃciency gains especially in estimating the correlation
coeﬃcients associated with long-term forecast horizons. However, they also report that
bias is larger with this second method.
8The programs for estimating the correlation coeﬃcients and the conﬁdence bands
are adapted versions of programs written in RATS that were download from Den Haan’s
website.
7Many papers (Clarida, Galí and Gertler 2000, McConnell and Pérez-
Quirós 2000, Cogley and Sargent 2005, Primiceri 2005, Sims and Zha 2004,
Valente 2003, and Vázquez 2004, among others), using diﬀerent data sets and
including real and/or nominal variables, have found that the post-Volcker era
is characterized by a more stable regime than the pre-Volcker era. Most
papers in this literature analyze whether it was bad monetary policy or
bad luck that caused the volatile and rising inﬂation of the 70’s. By ﬁtting
monetary policy rules for sub-periods, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) ﬁnd
evidence of a systematic change of monetary policy in the pre-Volcker era. A
similar conclusion is reached by Cogley and Sargent (2005) using a Bayesian
VAR with drifting parameters and stochastic volatility. These ﬁndings have
been disputed by Primiceri (2005) and Sims and Zha (2004) using structural
VARs. For instance, Primiceri (2005) provides evidence of both systematic
and non-systematic change in U.S. monetary policy. However, he also ﬁnds
that the systematic changes in monetary policy have had a negligible eﬀect
on the rest of the economy. Moreover, Primiceri (2005) also ﬁnds that the
role played by non-policy VAR innovations is more important than interest
rate policy in explaining the high inﬂation and unemployment in the 70’s
and early 80’s.
An alternative explanation for the decline in aggregate volatility is
provided by McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000). By decomposing output
growth by major product types (expenditure on goods, services and
structures), they show evidence that the fall of aggregate volatility comes
from a reduction in the volatility of durable goods.
In order to check whether there is a diﬀerence in the comovements between
Fed rate and deﬁc i ti nt h e s et w op e r i o d s ,w es p l i tt h es a m p l ei n t ot w oa l m o s t
equal sub-samples. Figures 6-7 show the comovement between Fed rate and
deﬁcit for the sub-samples 1961:2-1983:4 and 1984:1-2003:4, respectively.
As for the whole sample, the comovement is signiﬁcantly negative for the
two sub-samples up to two years whereas for the more recent sub-sample
t h ec o m o v e m e n ti ss t i l ls i g n i ﬁcantly negative at medium- and long-term
forecast horizons (up to 7-year forecast horizons). The signiﬁcant negative
comovement between the Fed rate and deﬁc i ta ts h o r t - t e r mf o r e c a s th o r i z o n s
is then a robust stylized fact that survives the policy shifts and outstanding
macroeconomic shocks that took place in the post-war period. Therefore,
this negative correlation pattern describes a set of potentially good statistics
for evaluating model performance.
At ﬁrst sight, the empirical results based on contemporaneous correlation
coeﬃcients considered in the previous section are somewhat diﬀerent from
those found with Den Haan’s method. In particular, the contemporaneous
correlation between Fed rate and deﬁcit has weakened in the post-Volcker
8era whereas there is still a signiﬁcant negative comovement between the
two policy instruments for this period, as shown in Figure 7.9 However,
a more careful examination shows that the correlation has weakened when
considering long-term dynamics (that is, the 20-year window) whereas the
short- and medium-term correlations described by the 5- and 10-year windows
are negative for most dates. This evidence is consistent with the signiﬁcant
negative comovement shown in Figure 7 when analyzing the comovement at
short- and medium-term forecast horizons (up to 7-years).
We have studied alternative measures of comovement between monetary
and ﬁscal policies in the last two sections, but have not investigated any sort
of causal relationship between Fed rate and deﬁcit. Moreover, the analysis of
comovement carried out in this section assumes that the VAR coeﬃcients are
stable over the whole period or, by considering two alternative sub-samples,
exogenously establishes the date of a structural change. By estimating an
MSVAR model, the next section overcomes these drawbacks and explores
(i) whether the dynamic correlation between Fed rate and deﬁcit exhibits
regime-switching, (ii) whether there is a Granger-causal relationship between




4 THE MARKOV-SWITCHING VAR
In this section we estimate a two-state MSVAR model with four lags that






where Zt =( it,πt,e yt,dt)0 and ξt ∼ N(0,I). it is the Fed funds rate, πt is
four-quarter rate of inﬂation (πt = 1
4
P3
i=0 πt−j, πt =4 0 0 ( l n Pt − lnPt−1)
9These results illustrate another example (Den Haan 2000, and Den Haan and Sumner,
2004, show other examples) in which by considering only contemporaneous correlation
coeﬃcients one may miss valuable dynamic information captured by the correlation
coeﬃcients between VAR forecast errors at diﬀerent horizons.
9and Pt is the implicit GDP price deﬂator), e yt is the output gap and dt is
the primary deﬁcit-output ratio (in short, the deﬁc i t ) .T h er e g i m ev a r i a b l e
st is either 1 or 2 and follows a ﬁrst-order two-state Markov process with
prob(st =1 |st−1 =1 )=p and prob(st =2 |st−1 =2 )=q.10 We estimate the
Cholesky decomposition Ψ(st) of Ω(st) where Ω(st)=Ψ(st)Ψ(st)0.
Closely following Pelletier (2006), the Markov switching covariance matrix
Ω(st) can be decomposed into
Ω(st) ≡ Σ(st)Γ(st)Σ(st),
where Σ(st) is a diagonal matrix made up of the standard deviations and the
matrix Γ(st) contains the correlations.11 Analysis of Γ(st) allows us to study
the regime-switching dynamic correlation between the alternative variables
included in the MSVAR. The estimates of the dynamic correlations matrix






Standard errors for the elements of Γ(st) are obtained by applying the Delta
method.12
The ﬁr s te q u a t i o no fs y s t e m( 1 )c a nb ev i e w e da sa na u g m e n t e dT a y l o r
monetary rule whereas the fourth equation can be understood as a ﬁscal
policy reaction function. We believe it is appropriate not to include
contemporaneous variables as regressors in the Fed’s reaction function or
in the ﬁscal policy rule. Arguably, this allows for a closer match between the
information set available to the researcher and the data used by the Fed and
ﬁscal authorities at the time of implementing monetary and ﬁscal policies,
respectively. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) and Rudebusch (2002), among
others, suggest and estimate empirical Taylor rule versions which are based
only on lagged variables.
The maximum likelihood estimation of the MSVAR model follows the
procedure suggested by Hamilton (1994, ch. 22). Appendix 2 brieﬂy
summarizes this procedure and displays the estimation results in Table A.1.
In order to compare the estimation results of system (1) easily for the
two alternative regimes, we next display those results in regression format
10The two-regime MSVAR model with four lags considered may seem quite restrictive
but it is the most the data can bear without extreme problems in estimation. Dealing with
the two-regime MSVAR already implies the cumbersome task of estimating 158 coeﬃcients.
11Pelletier (2006) assumes that the elements of Σ are modelled by a GARCH model
in absolute innovations. By contrast, we assume that all time-varying parameters in the
model including the elements of Σ are governed by the same regime-switching process.
12See, for instance, Greene (1993, p.297).
10(standard errors in parentheses) by showing only the parameter estimates
that are signiﬁcant at standard signiﬁcance levels:
Regime 1:
it =1 .2327it−1 +0 .1895e yt−1 − 0.2447dt−1 − 0.5654it−2 +0 .4534it−3,
(0.0908) (0.0559) (0.0733) (0.1307) (0.1361)
dt =0 .4650πt−1 +0 .9078dt−1 +0 .3433dt−2 − 0.1706dt−4,
(0.1508) (0.0835) (0.1265) (0.0851)
e yt =0 .3833 + 1.1882e yt−1 − 0.2773e yt−3 +0 .2988dt−3,
(0.1522) (0.1065) (0.1080) (0.1209)
πt =1 .1577πt−1 +0 .1108dt−4.
(0.0848) (0.0475)
Regime 2:
it =1 .8915πt−1 − 0.9239dt−1 +0 .6036it−3,
(0.6570) (0.2873) (0.2080)
dt =0 .2193it−1 − 0.4011πt−1 +0 .3924dt−1 +0 .7027dt−2 +0 .8767πt−3
(0.0310) (0.1199) (0.0587) (0.0659) (0.1780)
−0.2314e yt−3 − 0.9127dt−3 +0 .5580πt−4 +0 .3285e yt−4,
(0.0663) (0.1197) (0.1285) (0.0340)
e yt =2 .7232 − 0.3536it−1 +0 .5141e yt−1 +0 .9161πt−2 − 0.5771dt−2
(0.5229) (0.0688) (0.0990) (0.3923) (0.2122)
−2.0258πt−3 +1 .1461dt−3 − 0.2945it−4 +1 .3452πt−4 − 0.2724dt−3,
(0.3321) (0.3082) (0.0629) (0.2856) (0.1334)
πt =1 .3990 + 1.4525it−1 − 0.1018e yt−1 − 0.2003dt−1 − 0.4164πt−2.
(0.2912) (0.1643) (0.0511) (0.0517) (0.2462)
The estimation results can be summarized as follows. First, state 1
exhibits simpler dynamics than state 2. In particular, each variable is
11d e s c r i b e di nr e g i m e1b yi t so w nl a g sa n dt h ee ﬀects of other variables are
rather small. Second, state 1 perfectly ﬁts the post-Volcker period whereas
state 2 ﬁts well with the two oil-crises corresponding to 1972-1974 and 1978-
1981 as shown in Figure 9, where I have plotted the smoothed probabilities
of being in state 1 at each point in time. Third, based on the estimates of the
variance-covariance matrix Ω(st) (= Ψ(st)Ψ(st)0) displayed in Table A.1, we
observe that regime 1 (2) is characterized by low (high) volatility of interest
rate innovations and high (low) volatility of deﬁcit innovations. Fourth,
Figure 9 also shows that the number of observations attributed to regime
2 by the estimation procedure is small. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to make any
serious statement about how ﬁscal and monetary policies are determined in
regime 2. Fifth, looking at the correlation between the Fed rate and the
deﬁcit, Γ14, in Table 1 and the smoothed probabilities displayed in Figure
9, we see that the correlations between the ﬁscal and monetary instruments
appear to be dynamic in the pre-Volcker era, but they have remained static
during the post-Volcker era.
From the estimation results it is hard to establish what is the main
feature that distinguishes state 1 from state 2. State 2 is characterized
by high volatility of interest rate innovations and low volatility of deﬁcit
innovations. These two features could be understood as the equilibrium
outcome characterized by a passive (accommodating) monetary policy where
the ﬁscal authority is dominating the monetary authority. But this
interpretation is likely to be partially biased because the estimation results
are likely to be capturing that regime 2 ﬁts well with the two oil-crises
(supply shocks) that result in high inﬂation rates and these eﬀects are hard
to distinguish from the inﬂationary eﬀects of an accommodating monetary
policy.
The estimation results also suggest the existence of two diﬀerent periods:
the pre-Volcker era (up to 1984) and the post-Volcker era. The ﬁrst period
is characterized by frequent regime switches whereas the post-Volcker era is
characterized by a single regime, state 1. Moreover, the split between the
two periods is consistent with the pre-determined structural break assumed
in Section 3.
Focusing on the post-Volcker era, when regime 1 ﬁts well, we observe
that (i) the correlation between Fed rate and deﬁcit (Γ14)i ss i g n i ﬁcantly
negative, as shown in Table 1; (ii) the Fed’s policy reaction function shows
great persistence (that is, lagged Fed rates up to three lags are found to
be signiﬁcant); (iii) the Fed rate reacts positively to the output gap and
negatively to the deﬁcit; and (iv) interestingly, the Fed rate does not react
to inﬂation.
Result (i) supports the view stated in the Introduction that the ﬁscal and
12monetary authorities share a common stabilization objective. The highly
persistent Fed reaction function, result (ii), is consistent with the empirical
evidence found in the relevant literature (see, for instance, Clarida, Galí and
Gertler, 2000). There are several arguments suggesting that the signiﬁcant
role of lagged interest rate may reﬂect the existence of an optimal policy
inertia. These arguments range from the traditional concern of central banks
for the stability of ﬁnancial markets (see Goodfriend, 1991 and Sack, 1997)
to the more psychological argument posed by Lowe and Ellis (1997) that
there might be a political incentive for smoothing whenever policymakers
are likely to be embarrassed by reversals in the direction of interest-rate
changes if they believe that the public may interpret them as repudiations of
previous actions. By contrast, a series of interest-rate changes in the same
direction looks like a well-designed programme, and that may give rise to the
sluggish behavior of the intervention interest rate.
Result (iii) is partially consistent with the existence of a monetary Taylor
rule which establishes that the interest rate responds positively to the output
g a p .H o w e v e r ,t h ee s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t( i v )a l s os u g g e s t st h a tt h eF e dd o e sn o t
respond to inﬂation, in contrast to the predictions of a standard Taylor rule.
One possible explanation for the latter result is that inﬂation and interest
rates are highly correlated. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to distinguish the eﬀect
of lagged inﬂation from the eﬀect of lagged interest rate on the current Fed
rate.
Result (iii) also establishes a negative response of the Fed rate to lagged
deﬁcit, which is consistent with the view that the two economic authorities
share a common stabilization objective and that monetary policy shows
policy inertia. For instance, the deﬁc i ti se x p e c t e dt oi n c r e a s ed u r i n ga
recession, but the interest rate decreases in small-steps due to policy inertia,
which leads to a negative correlation between current interest rates and
lagged deﬁcits.
Looking at the ﬁs c a lp o l i c yr e a c t i o nf u n c t i o ni nt h eﬁrst regime, we
observe that the deﬁcit shows a great deal of persistence, but less than
that observed for the interest rate. Moreover, ﬁscal policy reacts positively
to lagged inﬂation. The latter result is somewhat surprising because
o n ew o u l de x p e c tt h eo p p o s i t e : t h ed e ﬁcit decreases (increases) during
expansions (recessions) where inﬂation usually increases (decreases). This
result is probably reﬂe c t i n gt h ef a c tt h a ts o m eb e h a v i o r a lp a r a m e t e r sa r e
diﬃcult to identify from reduced-form coeﬃcient estimates because these are
cumbersome functions of structural and policy parameters.
[Insert TABLE 1]
13Note: Recall that the order of variables in the MSVAR is: Fed rate, inﬂation,
output gap and deﬁcit. Therefore, Γ14 denotes the correlation coeﬃcient between
the 1-period ahead forecast errors associated with Fed rate and deﬁcit equations
in the VAR.
More generally, we carry out Granger-causality tests based on a likelihood
r a t i o( L R )t e s t .T h eL Rs t a t i s t i cf o rt h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h ed e ﬁc i td o e sn o t
Granger cause the Fed rate in the ﬁrst regime is 24.08. The LR statistic
for the hypothesis that the output gap does not Granger cause the Fed rate
in the ﬁrst regime is 31.61. The LR statistics for the hypotheses that the
Fed funds rate does not Granger cause the deﬁcit and the output gap in the
ﬁrst regime are 5.72 and 4.70, respectively. These LR statistic tests are all
distributed as a χ2(4). The 5% (1%) critical value is 9.49 (13.3). These tests
thus show that deﬁcit and output gap Granger-cause Fed rate at all standard
conﬁdence levels in the ﬁrst regime, but the opposite is not true.
[Insert FIGURE 8]
5C O N C L U S I O N S
Some economists have the perception that the Federal Reserve counteracts
aggregate demand variations caused by deﬁcit changes. In this case, one
would expect a positive correlation between the Fed funds rate and the
primary deﬁcit-output ratio. However, it is also plausible for monetary and
ﬁscal authorities to hold common stabilization objectives and thus the Fed
rate and the primary deﬁcit would show a negative correlation. This paper
studies empirically which is the dominant eﬀect.
Using quarterly U.S. data over the post-war period, the empirical results
show a negative comovement between the two policy instruments most of
the time. This result provides empirical evidence that monetary and ﬁscal
authorities hold a common stabilization objective that sometimes breaks
down when fast-growing Federal government debt, including its associated
interest payments, shifts ﬁscal policy priorities to budget balancing.
Moreover, the empirical results also show that deﬁcit-output ratio and output
gap Granger-cause the Fed funds rate during the post-Volcker era, but the
opposite is not true.
14APPENDIX 1
For the sake of illustration, this appendix describes the method suggested
by Den Haan (2000) for measuring error correlations at diﬀerent forecast
horizons.
L e tu sc o n s i d e ra nN-vector of random variables Xt. The vector Xt may
include any combination of stationary processes and integrated processes
of arbitrary order. In order to characterize the comovement between two
variables, say the Fed funds rate, it, and the primary deﬁcit-output ratio, dt,
Xt must contain at least it and dt. Consider the following VAR





where α, β,a n dγ denote ﬁxed N-vectors of constants, Al are ﬁxed N x
N coeﬃcient matrices. Ut is an N-dimensional white noise process, that is,
E(Ut)=0 , E(UtU0
t)=Ωu and E(UtU0
s)=0for s 6= t. L is the total number of
lags included. The K-period ahead forecast and the K-period ahead forecast
error of the random variable it are denoted by Etit+K and iue
t+K,t, respectively.
Similarly, we can deﬁne Etdt+K and d
ue





As pointed out by Den Haan (2000), if all time series included in Xt are
stationary, then the correlation coeﬃcient of the forecast errors will converge
to the unconditional correlation coeﬃcient between it and dt as K goes to
inﬁnity. If Xt includes integrated processes, then the correlation coeﬃcients
may not converge but they can be estimated consistently for ﬁxed K.
Moreover, Den Haan (2000) shows the relationship between correlation




t+K,t by COV(K) and, without loss of generality, let us
assume that there are M structural shocks driving the Fed rate and deﬁcit.


















k is the k-th period impulse response of variable z to a one-
standard deviation disturbance of the m-th shock. Therefore, the covariance
15between Fed rate and deﬁcit is simply the average of the product of the Fed
rate and deﬁcit impulses across the diﬀerent structural shocks.
APPENDIX 2
This appendix brieﬂy summarizes the recursive algorithm implemented in
the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. We focus on the four-variable
two-state MSVAR model considered in this paper. Let θ denote the vector
of parameters. Let b ξt/t denote the 2 × 1 vector containing the researcher
inference about the values of st (=1 ,2) based on data obtained through date
t and conditional on a given value for θ.F i n a l l y ,l e tb ξt+1/t denote the 2 × 1
vector containing the one-period forecast of the values of st+1 (=1 ,2) based
on data obtained through date t. Hamilton (1994, Ch. 22) shows that the
optimal inference and the one-period forecast can be solved recursively from
the following two equations:
b ξt/t =
b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt
10(b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt)
,
b ξt+1/t = Pb ξt/t
where the symbol ¯ denotes element-by-element multiplication, 1 denotes a
2 × 1 vector of 1s, P is the 2 × 2 transition probability matrix and ηt is a















[Zt − Υ(st) − B(st)Zt−1]
0
[Ω(st)]
−1 [Zt − Υ(st) − B(st)Zt−1]},
for st =1 ,2.
The log likelihood function $(θ) for the data set evaluated at a value of θ










b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt
´i
.
16The value of θ that maximizes $(θ) is found using the maximum
likelihood routine programmed in GAUSS. The Newton-Raphson numerical




[1] Cogley, T. and T.J. Sargent, 2005, Drifts in volatilities: Monetary
policies and outcomes in the post WWII U.S., Review of Economic
Dynamics 8, 262-302.
[2] Clarida, R., J. Galí and M. Gertler, 2000, Monetary policy rules and
macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115, 147-180.
[3] Davig, T., E.M. Leeper and H. Chung, 2004, Monetary and ﬁscal policy
switching, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 10362.
[4] DeLong, J.B., 2003, Macroeconomics (McGraw Hill, New York).
[5] Den Haan, W.J., 2000, The comovement between output and prices,
Journal of Monetary Economics 46, 3-30.
[6] Den Haan, W.J. and S.W. Sumner, 2004, The comovement between real
activity and prices in the G7, European Economic Review 48, 1333-1347.
[7] Favero, C.A. and T. Monacelli, 2003, Monetary-ﬁscal mix and inﬂation
performance: Evidence from the U.S., Centre for Economic Policy
Research discussion paper 3887.
[8] Goodfriend, M., 1991, Interest rates and the conduct of monetary policy,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 24, 231-274.
[9] Greene, W.H., 1993, Econometric analysis (Macmillan Publishing
Company, New York).
[10] Hamilton, J.D., 1994, Time series analysis (Princeton University Press,
New Jersey).
17[11] Leeper E., 1991, Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and
ﬁscal policies, Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129-147.
[12] Lowe, P. and L. Ellis, 1997, The smoothing of oﬃcial interest rates, in:
P. Lowe, P., ed., Monetary policy and inﬂation targeting, Proceedings
of a conference (Reserve Bank of Australia) 286-312.
[13] McConnell, M.M. and G. Pérez-Quirós, 2000, Output ﬂuctuations in
the United States: What has changed since the early 80s?, American
Economic Review 90, 1464-1476.
[14] Pagan, A., 1984, Econometric issues in the analysis of regressions with
generated regressors, International Economic Review 25, 221-247.
[15] Pelletier, D., 2006, Regime switching for dynamic correlations, Journal
of Econometrics 131, 445-473.
[16] Primiceri, G., 2005, Time varying structural autoregressions and
monetary policy, Review of Economic Studies 72, 821-852.
[17] Rudebusch, G.D., 2002, Term structure evidence on interest rate
smoothing and monetary policy inertia, Journal of Monetary Economics
49, 1161-1187.
[18] Sack, B., 1997, Uncertainty and gradual monetary policy, Federal
Reserve Board, mimeo.
[19] Sargent, T.J., 1999, The conquest of American inﬂation (Princeton
University Press, New Jersey).
[20] Sims, C.A. and T. Zha, 2004, Were there regime switches in US monetary
policy?, Princeton University, mimeo.
[21] Valente, G., 2003, Monetary policy rules and regime shifts, Applied
Financial Economics 13, 525-535.
[22] Vázquez, J., 2004, Switching regimes in the term structure of interest
rates: A case for the Lucas proof equilibrium?, Studies in Nonlinear
Dynamics and Econometrics 8 (1), Article 5.
18Table 1. Estimation results for the correlation matrix
Γ12 Γ13 Γ14 Γ23 Γ24 Γ34
Regime 1 0.2163 −0.1236 −0.1926 −0.2429 −0.1371 −0.1790
(0.085) (0.088) (0.082) (0.090) (0.099) (0.082)
Regime 2 −0.0704 0.0018 0.1772 0.3005 −0.2882 −0.5854
(0.163) (0.196) (0.223) (0.149) (0.140) (0.223)
19Table A.1. Estimation results for the two-state four-variable MSVAR model
(1).
Parameter Estimate Stand. error Parameter Estimate Stand. error
γ1(1) 0.1200 0.0899 b2
31(1) 0.0816 0.1692
γ2(1) 0.0758 0.0611 b2
32(1) −0.3430 0.3589
γ3(1) 0.3833 0.1522 b2
33(1) −0.0311 0.1222
γ4(1) −0.1364 0.1179 b2
34(1) −0.0760 0.1604
γ1(2) −1.8072 1.2372 b2
41(1) 0.1520 0.1402
γ2(2) 1.3990 0.2912 b2
42(1) −0.2000 0.2899
γ3(2) 2.7233 0.5229 b2
43(1) −0.0652 0.1091
γ4(2) 0.3605 0.1855 b2
44(1) 0.3433 0.1265
b1
11(1) 1.2317 0.0908 b3
11(1) 0.4534 0.1361
b1
12(1) 0.2150 0.1307 b3
12(1) −0.2768 0.2176
b1
13(1) 0.1895 0.0559 b3
13(1) 0.1582 0.0888
b1
14(1) −0.2447 0.0733 b3
14(1) 0.1518 0.0829
b1
21(1) −0.0374 0.0605 b3
21(1) −0.0818 0.0649
b1
22(1) 1.1577 0.0848 b3
22(1) −0.1923 0.1677
b1
23(1) 0.0303 0.0410 b3
23(1) −0.0618 0.0525
b1
24(1) −0.0112 0.0421 b3
24(1) −0.0676 0.0518
b1
31(1) −0.1184 0.1191 b3
31(1) 0.1069 0.1456
b1
32(1) 0.2893 0.2151 b3
32(1) −0.1658 0.3435
b1
33(1) 1.1882 0.1065 b3
33(1) −0.2773 0.1080
b1
34(1) −0.1267 0.1170 b3
34(1) 0.2988 0.1209
b1
41(1) −0.1244 0.1075 b3
41(1) 0.0088 0.1051
b1
42(1) 0.4650 0.1508 b3
42(1) −0.2986 0.3137
b1
43(1) −0.0633 0.0867 b3
43(1) 0.0145 0.1215
b1
44(1) 0.9078 0.0835 b3
44(1) −0.1213 0.0767
b2
11(1) −0.5654 0.1307 b4
11(1) −0.1467 0.0840
b2
12(1) 0.0308 0.2128 b4
12(1) 0.0116 0.1398
b2
13(1) 0.0893 0.0961 b4
13(1) −0.0617 0.0562
b2
14(1) 0.0749 0.1128 b4
14(1) 0.0724 0.0755
b2
21(1) 0.1075 0.0840 b4
21(1) 0.0080 0.0381
b2
22(1) −0.0129 0.1447 b4
22(1) 0.0154 0.1094
b2
23(1) 0.0253 0.0605 b4
23(1) 0.0407 0.0425
b2
24(1) −0.0061 0.0563 b4
24(1) 0.1081 0.0475
20Table A.1. (Continued)
Parameter Estimate Stand. error Parameter Estimate Stand. error
b4
31(1) −0.0931 0.0903 b2
33(2) 0.2268 0.1233
b4
32(1) 0.1526 0.2391 b2
34(2) −0.5771 0.2122
b4
33(1) 0.0522 0.0909 b2
41(2) −0.0528 0.0303
b4
34(1) −0.0755 0.1055 b2
42(2) −0.1925 0.2252
b4
41(1) −0.0013 0.0714 b2
43(2) −0.0987 0.0544
b4
42(1) 0.0444 0.1929 b2
44(2) 0.7027 0.0659
b4
43(1) 0.0779 0.0890 b3
11(2) 0.6036 0.2080
b4
44(1) −0.1706 0.0851 b3
12(2) −0.7797 1.0088
b1
11(2) 0.0286 0.2310 b3
13(2) −0.2272 0.3784
b1
12(2) 1.8915 0.6570 b3
14(2) 0.3773 0.6037
b1
13(2) 0.2518 0.2584 b3
21(2) −0.0226 0.0308
b1
14(2) −0.9239 0.2873 b3
22(2) 0.1746 0.2255
b1
21(2) −0.0541 0.0390 b3
23(2) 0.0531 0.0922
b1
22(2) 1.4525 0.1643 b3
24(2) 0.0693 0.1505
b1
23(2) −0.1018 0.0511 b3
31(2) 0.0916 0.0576
b1
24(2) −0.2003 0.0517 b3
32(2) 2.0258 0.3321
b1
31(2) 0.3536 0.0688 b3
33(2) −0.1135 0.1677
b1
32(2) 0.0568 0.2390 b3
34(2) 1.1461 0.3082
b1
33(2) 0.5141 0.0990 b3
41(2) −0.0496 0.0271
b1
34(2) −0.1506 0.1272 b3
42(2) 0.8767 0.1780
b1
41(2) 0.2193 0.0310 b3
43(2) 0.2314 0.0663
b1
42(2) −0.4011 0.1199 b3
44(2) 0.9127 0.1197
b1
43(2) −0.0529 0.0437 b4
11(2) 0.1062 0.1991
b1
44(2) 0.3924 0.0587 b4
12(2) 0.2535 0.5745
b2
11(2) 0.2017 0.2199 b4
13(2) −0.3078 0.1956
b2
12(2) −0.8170 1.2893 b4
14(2) 0.3127 0.2244
b2
13(2) 0.3079 0.4239 b4
21(2) −0.0334 0.0360
b2
14(2) −0.0312 0.3294 b4
22(2) 0.0735 0.1512
b2
21(2) 0.0160 0.0427 b4
23(2) 0.0186 0.0564
b2
22(2) −0.4164 0.2462 b4
24(2) −0.1284 0.0711
b2
23(2) −0.0713 0.0705 b4
31(2) −0.2945 0.0629
b2
24(2) −0.0617 0.0964 b4
32(2) 1.3452 0.2856
b2
31(2) 0.0488 0.0754 b4
33(2) −0.1203 0.0881
b2
32(2) 0.9161 0.3923 b4
34(2) −0.2724 0.1334
21Table A.1. (Continued)
Parameter Estimate Stand. error Parameter Estimate Stand. error
b4
41(2) 0.0098 0.0257 ψ12(2) −0.0181 0.0424
b4
42(2) −0.5580 0.1285 ψ13(2) 0.0009 0.1014
b4
43(2) 0.3285 0.0340 ψ14(2) 0.0350 0.0464
b4
44(2) 0.1001 0.0527 ψ22(2) 0.2564 0.0239
ψ11(1) 0.3631 0.0239 ψ23(2) 0.1539 0.0845
ψ12(1) 0.0530 0.0212 ψ24(2) −0.0547 0.0280
ψ13(1) −0.0685 0.0489 ψ33(2) 0.4870 0.0494
ψ14(1) −0.0924 0.0431 ψ34(2) −0.1042 0.0271
ψ22(1) 0.2393 0.0152 ψ44(2) 0.1550 0.0196
ψ23(1) −0.1226 0.0531 p 0.9793 0.0052
ψ24(1) −0.0469 0.0463 q 0.9993 0.0025
ψ33(1) 0.5358 0.0322
ψ34(1) −0.1113 0.0464
ψ44(1) 0.4550 0.0300 log
ψ11(2) 1.2033 0.1874 likelihood −1.8560
Notes: γi(st) denotes a generic element of vector Υ(st), bi
jh(st) denotes a generic
element of matrix Bi(st) and ψjh(st) denotes a generic element of matrix Ψ(st)0.
22Figure 1: Data set time series
23Figure 2: Dynamic correlations (5-year window)
24Figure 3: Dynamic correlations (10-year window)
25Figure 4: Dynamic correlations (20-year window)
26Figure 5: Fed rate and deﬁcit forecast errors (1961-2003)
27Figure 6: Fed rate and deﬁcit forecast errors (1961-1983)
28Figure 7: Fed rate and deﬁcit forecast errors (1984-2003)
29Figure 8: Smoothed probabilities from the MSVAR
30